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• Satellite broadcasts :
• orbital data and ephemeris
• precise time stamp (atomic clocks)
• Receiver measurements:
• compares transmission and
reception time (flight time)
• distance between satellite and
receiver.
• Receiver placed in a spherical shell:
• trilateration
• Position + time
Satellite Navigation – General Principles 
• Navigation: automotive, aircrafts, shipping, space
• Geodesy: surveying, mapping, geology, archaeology, civil engineering,
topography
• Time keeping: mobile communication
• systems, internet traffic
• Search and Rescue (SAR)
• Fleet management
• Traffic control
• Geolocation based games
• Marketing
• Social Networks
Satellite Navigation – Application Fields 
Safety of life applications (e.g. Civil aviation) 
Safety of life applications 
• Rely more on GNSS in the future (SESAR and NextGen)
• Allow for new type of approaches (e.g. curve)
• Increment of air traffic density  Reduce distance between aircrafts
• Not only accuracy is therefore important  Integrity and availability
GNSS Vulnerabilities 
System Errors: 
• Satellite clock
• Orbital parameters Atmospheric: 
• Tropo/Ionospheric Storms
• Scintillation
Interferences: 
• Unintentional
• Intentional (Jamming)
Local Effects: 
• Multipath
• NLOS
Fake GNSS signal 
(Spoofing) 
GNSS Threats 
• Characterization of Satellite Orbit and Clock Errors
System Error Monitoring 
SIS Verification with 
High Gain Antenna  Experimentation and Verification 
Network (EV-NET) 
Detection, Analysis and alert of Ionospheric 
Events 
• Modeling of the Ionosphere through the
determination of the TEC (Total Electron
Content)
• Detection of the amplitude and phase of
scintillation for multifrequency GNSS
measurements
Ionosphere Monitoring Prediction Center (IMPC) 
Evaluation of measurements and 
system performance through 
flight trials 
DLR Research Aircraft 
D-CODE (Dornier 228)
ATTAS (VFW  614)
ATRA (Airbus 320)
• GNSS signals are deeply buried in the noise and can be easily disturbed by
interference from other signals
• Received power at Earth surface:
~ -160 dBW  =
 0.000 000 000 000 000 1 Watt 
• Can be disturbed by:
• Accumulated noise (e.g. UWB)
• High power pulses (DME, TACAN)
• High Power Continuous Wave (Harmonics from TV stations etc.)
• Personal Privacy Devices Jammers
RF Interferences 
• Intentional jamming is reality!
• Personal Privacy Devices (jammers)
disturb GPS and GBAS reference stations
• Operation  illegal
• Price: $ 30 - $ 200 in Internet
• Interference mitigation required
Interference by  GPS Jammers (PPD) at  Newark Airport 
Airport Newark Liberty International, 
Motorway close to airport 
GBAS Reference- 
Antenna 
Jammer 
Source: R.H. Mitch et al., Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS Jammers, 
ION GNSS 2011 
125 m 
Galileo E1/E6 standard and 
miniaturized  
GPS miniaturized GPS conformal 
Galileo E1/E5 standard and 
miniaturized  
Some DLR GNSS Antenna Arrays 
Practical Realization: Complete System 
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Beamforming and DOA-estimation in Flight Tests 
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Repeater Test Set-Up 
Direction of Arrival (DOA) Estimation in Repeater Scenario 
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Technique – 2D ESPRIT 
Concept of Joint Attitude Determination and Spoofing 
Detection Algorithm 
Error  
Detection & 
Exclusion 
M. Appel, A. Konovaltsev, and M. Meurer, " Robust Spoofing Detection and Mitigation based on Direction
of Arrival Estimation," in Proc. ION GNSS+ 2015, Tampa, FL, USA, 2015.
Loss of satellites due to maneuvers: Inertial Coasting 
• Loss of satellites due to maneuvers
• Time gap due to restart of smoothing filters
Continuity and availability 
requirements might not be fulfilled 
Multisensor Fusion 
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• Improving the signal-to-noise ration (CN0 improvements of 10 dB
possible)
• Reliable tracking the Line of Sight (LoS) satellite signal
Highlight: Inertial aided array antenna attitude 
• Accuracy improvement
• Low sensitivity to faults/biases
• Local and global fault
detectability improvement
• Availability improvement thanks
to the reduction of  Protection
Levels
Multisensor Fusion 
• It is meant to be a GNSS backup System 
Alternative Position Navigation and Timing (APNT) 
Signals under consideration: 
• Distance Measurement Equipment (DME), eDME 
• L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) 
• Universal Access Transceiver (UAT)  
• Mode S transponder/1090 Mhz (ADS-B) 
DLR Oberpfaffenhofen 
Employees: 1.590 
Area: 245.000 m² 
Research institutes and facilities: 
• Microwaves and Radar Institute
• Institute of Communications and
Navigation
• Institute of Atmospheric Physics
• Remote Sensing Technology Institute
• Institute of Robotics and Mechatronics
• German Remote Sensing Data Centre
• Space Operations and Astronaut
Training
• Galileo Control Centre
• Flight Experiments
Institute of Communication and Navigation 
Employees 
• ~ 140 employees
• ~ 115 scientists/PhD candidates
Facilities 
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